The sciences of mind and brain are today attracting almost as much hype and hope as genetics. And just as genetics gave rise to 'genethics' through the study of its ethical, legal and social implications (ELSI), so too we are seeing the invention of 'neuroethics'. At the forefront of this development is the Dana Foundation, which published the book here reviewed; and among others who have debated the subject is the (US) President's Council on Bioethics, of which Professor Gazzaniga is a member. Books such as Gazzaniga's are generally to be welcomed, in providing tools to help the non-neuroscientist grasp the ethical, social, legal and indeed philosophical aspects of this subject. (Others who have trodden this path are Steven Rose, Susan Greenfield and the Dana Foundation itself.) In The Ethical Brain Gazzaniga discusses four of the central topics of concern-life-span neuroethics, brain enhancement, free will and personal responsibility, and the relationship between brain structure and moral decision-making. The first two of these were examined in detail by the President's Council on Bioethics, and readers familiar with the resultant publications may take a 'kremlinological' interest in his departures from the Council's corporate line. But for most readers the book will be valued for its clear and straightforward accounts of current neuroscientific thinking on such topics as when an embryo acquires personhood, what brainstem death is, how far neuroscience undermines the possibility of free will, and what kind of cognitive enhancements or behavioural modifications will be possible. Gazzaniga has little to say about psychiatry or neurosurgery.
The focus of his attention is largely on the policy implications of neuroscientific knowledge. However, much of what he discusses lies properly within the domain of philosophy. Empirical evidence from the neurosciences constrains what conceptual frameworks we may use to make sense of brain and mind, but it does not actually fix which of those frameworks makes most consistent and coherent sense. For example, how much does knowledge of the early development of the nervous system help in determining whether an embryo is a human being, or indeed a human person, and when it becomes so? If a priori we have decided that sentience and the capacity for developing self-consciousness are the necessary conditions for personhood, then neuroscience data will help us decide what operational or diagnostic criteria need to be met for these conditions to be satisfied. This conceptual clarification is necessary and is independent of the neuroscience research, on pain of circularity in reasoning. Yet in public debates on neuroethics we are tending to look to neuroscientists as the experts who will tell us whether a 3-day, a 30-day or a 130-day embryo or fetus is a person or not. I am not suggesting that we should turn to philosophers (or theologians) instead; rather that a genuinely interdisciplinary discussion is necessary. Similar difficulties arise with the discussion of responsibility as understood by neuroscientists, philosophers, and the courts, and with discussions of the nature and legitimate limits to cognitive enhancement. Gazzaniga provides much useful information and material for discussion, but for enlightenment on the deep philosophical and ethical issues salient to the neurosciences, the reader needs to go elsewhere.
While noting that the philosophical level is not high, I did enjoy this book, and can warmly recommend it as an introduction for the non-neuroscientist. Gazzaniga's writing style is pleasantly informal, and how refreshing it is to read a scientist who engages in debate without hyping up either promise or perils.
Richard E Ashcroft
Medical Ethics Unit Imperial College London, UK
Other books received
On the table in my window sits a collection of books for which, with my editorship running out, I failed to find a reviewer. On top of the pile is Dr Ayan Panja's An Essential Medical Miscellany, 1 advertised in the JRSM as 'everything you ever wanted to know about medicine and much more.' The book is an obvious though undeclared imitation of the best-seller Schott's Original Miscellany, right down to shape and size, but I am not convinced that Panja shares Schott's obsessive attention to detail. Where Schott gives us verbatim the Irish Code Duello of 1777 (rules for duelling in Ireland), Panja tells us that 'In Paraguay, duelling is legal provided both parties are registered blood donors'. These very words can be found on numerous internet sites: Schott, I think, would have made inquiries in Paraguay and (if the statement is true) offered guidance on how to issue the challenge-for instance, 'Sir, I demand satisfaction if you, like me, are a registered blood donor'. Among the few referenced items in the book are the Wilson and 'Junger' criteria for screening: if this entry persuades people that screening is not always a good idea, three cheers-but the next edition should spell Jungner correctly. Panja's method for taking the blood pressure seems to require three hands. I am of course nitpicking; in truth this miscellany is what used to be called a commonplace book-an engaging collection of random facts and factoids. Harmless fun.
Now some historical items. The History of Albuminous Nephritis 2 is a translation from the French and Latin of a work by Pierre-François Olive Rayer (1793-1867) originally published in 1840. In his introduction, Campbell Mackenzie describes Rayer as 'one of the foremost and greatest physicians to have adorned the renal specialty, dwarfing in many ways the achievements of his renowned colleague, friend and inspiration, Richard Bright.' Rayer was the first to distinguish acute from chronic nephritis, and his History bemoans the failure of clinicians for many generations before Bright to see the connection between dropsy and an abnormality of the kidneys. Read these translations with their accompanying commentaries, and you will wonder just how the work of this great clinicianscientist could have been so widely ignored across the Channel. The answer, alas, is chauvinism. I looked up Rayer in another work received for review, Bibliography of Medical and Biomedical Biography, 3 and found two books (in French) published in 1931 and 1997. Now in its third edition, with about 40% more biographies than the second, Morton and Moore clearly retains its place as a prime work of reference. Lastly, a word about David Hay's history of the St. Alban's Medical Club, Honest Talk and Wholesome Wine. 4 The club, which has been meeting since 1789, has had some very famous members, including Richard Bright and Thomas Addison. However, scientific discourse was not its main purpose, and Dr Hay's account tells us about personalities and interactions-wagers, blackballing and so on. Much of the book consists of mini-biographies of the members, derived principally from sources other than the club records. Seemingly the wine and talk were not much to the taste of Addison or Bright, neither of whom stayed long. In a foreword, Sir Richard Bayliss says that Dr Hay has done the St. Alban's Club proud. That is true.
